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Abstract: 
This article explores the UK vote in 2016 to exit the European Union, colloquially known as 
‘Brexit’. Brexit has been portrayed as a British backlash against globalisation and a desire 
for a reassertion of sovereignty by the UK as a nation-state. In this context, a vote to leave 
the EU (European Union) has been regarded by its protagonists as a vote to ‘take back 
control’ to ‘make our own laws’ and ‘let in [only] who we want’. We take a particular 
interest in the stance of key ‘Brexiteers’ in the UK towards regulation; for example of the 
labour market. The article commences by assessing the notion of Brexit as a means to 
secure further market liberalisation. This analysis is then followed by an account of 
migration as a key issue, the withdrawal process and likely future trajectory of Brexit. We 
argue that in contrast to the expectations of those who voted Leave in 2016, the UK as a 
mid-sized open economy will be a rule-taker and will either remain in the European 
regulatory orbit, or otherwise drift into the American one.  
JEL codes: F2, F53, F55, F66, K33 
Keywords: Brexit, European Union, immigration, inequality, market regulation, nationalism, 
neoliberalism, deregulation, sovereignty 
Introduction  
On 23rd June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU (European Union). The result, commonly known as 
‘Brexit’, has been interpreted as a reaction against globalisation and ‘metropolitan elites’ (Pidd, 2016; 
Frieden, 2018); that is, as a response by certain localities to feeling ‘left behind’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 
2018). Since then, there has been much speculation about why people voted to leave, with key 
reasons being concerns about the economy, a desire for Britain to regain sovereignty, and a response 
to immigration above all else (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). Furthermore, the 2016 Referendum result 
highlighted deep divisions in the fabric of UK communities and regions — and indeed between the 
four constituent nations of the UK, with Scotland and Northern Ireland voting decisively to stay in the 
EU, whilst England and Wales voted to leave (Menon, 2018).1  
Recent research has related voter decisions to demographics, focusing on the ‘who’ rather 
than the ‘why’ (Hearne et al., 2019). This literature has tended to frame the Brexit result by correlating 
it to socio-demographic characteristics such as education, age, ethnicity and income. As an example, 
a recent study found that those who were most likely to vote Leave were those with low incomes (i.e., 
less than GBP1,200 per month), among other reasons and those who felt that ‘Britain has got a lot 
worse in the last ten years’ (Swales, 2016:7). In this context, we critically examine the arguments that 
posit the Brexit vote as a rejection of the neoliberal orthodoxy that has generated such feelings of 
disenfranchisement (Hearne et al., 2019). 
The article discusses the contradictions in the anti-neoliberal discourse after considering the 
position of the UK in the development of the Common Market and other policies within the EU. The 
first section  questions the perception of some ‘Leavers’ (so-called left-wing Brexiters, or ‘Lexit’ 
proponents) in relation to the EU as an institution that ‘imposed’ neoliberalism — in particular, the 
type of neoliberalism that will prioritise the interests of global capital and that benefits the 
competitiveness of global markets in the name of increased freedom and flexibility. This discussion is 
followed by an analysis of the position of those whom we label ‘Rexit’ proponents, i.e., those right-
wing Brexiteers who base their views in identity politics. However, as in with the Lexit argument, there 
is a contradiction between what these Brexiteers think they will be able to achieve through Brexit and 
what (any type of) Brexit will actually deliver, with the Conservative Party currently in government. 
 
Brexit as a revolt against neoliberalism? The Lexit and Rexit arguments 
Lexit and the discussion of neoliberalism and national economic sovereignty: the first contradiction  
It has been argued that the Brexit vote represented a rejection of the associated ideas of globalisation 
and a neoliberal policy regime (Jessop, 2018).  Fetzer (2018) found that neoliberal austerity policies 
were a significant contributing factor for the increasing support for Brexit. In addition to the overall 
austerity shock, reductions in the Council Tax Benefit, Disability Living Allowance reductions and the 
2012 introduction of the ‘Bedroom Tax’2 drove up support for the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) between 2010 and 2015 (Fetzer, 2018). Support for this political party has widely been 
associated with support for Brexit, a key UKIP policy — as its name indicates – and with Euroscepticism 
more generally.   
Hostility towards the EU as a purported capitalist project has been endemic to sections of the 
political left in the UK since accession in 1973. It was a key factor in the first referendum on EEC 
membership in 1975 under the Wilson Labour government, and was traditionally typical of the Labour 
Party. While the Lexit argument may have started from this basis, nevertheless, both the UK and the 
EU have dramatically changed since 1973 from a neoliberalist point of view. An understanding of 
where the neoliberalist project started in Europe is essential to a critical analysis of the role of both 
the EU and the UK in the development of contemporary capitalism. It is also essential to compare the 
different social and economic models as well as employment and trade union legislation in different 
EU countries in order to understand the room for manoeuvre that the EU leaves in these areas, and 
what state members decide to implement individually. However, due to space limitations, this paper 
will not elaborate on these matters.   
Under the Thatcher Government in the 1980s, the process of liberalisation in the UK entailed 
privatisation and market-oriented regulation; most notably in a succession of anti-union legislative 
changes (Toye, 1987). The results of these policies led to a significant shift from the interests of 
workers to that of capital, and an unprecedented rise of corporate power and decline in the bargaining 
power of workers (Chowdhury and Żuk, 2018). 
At the European level, Thatcher was a keen proponent of (and played a major part in) the 
creation of a Single European Act (SEA) (the precursor to the Single Market) that sought to harmonise 
regulations across the EU pertaining to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. 
Thatcher agreed to the creation of the SEA, even though that meant accepting an EU-led 
institutionalisation of the process of harmonising regulations, and therefore a push towards 
integration of the European Economic Community (EEC) (Fontana and Parsons, 2015).  
 It was only after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which brought the Single Market, that 
‘Euroscepticism’ in the Conservative Party began to grow (Barth and Bijsmans, 2018). This growth 
occurred because of the degree of integration that this Treaty incurred. The Maastricht Treaty was 
also accompanied by the Social Chapter that sought to provide a platform of basic employment rights 
across EU member states, so as to allay fears from unions of a ‘race to the bottom’ (Barth and 
Bijsmans, 2018). The Eurosceptic group of Conservative MPs sought inspiration from Margaret 
Thatcher’s 1988 Bruges speech, where she commented that ‘we have not embarked on the business 
of throwing back the frontiers of the state at home, only to see a European super-state getting ready 
to exercise a new dominance from Brussels’ (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2019)3.  
Hence, herein lies the central contradiction that drives the Brexit dynamic. At an economic 
level Brexit only ‘makes sense’ if one regards the European economic model as overly ‘burdensome’ 
and characterised by excessive regulation. According to this belief, once released from these 
regulatory shackles, the consequent free market utopia would enable the unbridled pursuit of 
individual wealth, and society as a whole would be better off. This is the world view that underpins 
the writings of economist Patrick Minford and others of a libertarian persuasion. Indeed, many in this 
camp claim that the short-term costs of Brexit are worth it for the longer -term gains that realignment 
of trade and production would offer the UK economy (for example, see Newman, 2018). 
A critical examination of the words of lead Brexiteers suggests that the majority (the so-called 
‘Rexiters’), rather than repudiating neoliberalism per se, have sought to impose a more vociferous 
variety of it than that which EU membership to date has prevented in the UK. The distinct EU emphasis 
on ‘social partnership’ between capital and labour, and the promulgation of laws upholding consumer, 
worker and environmental rights, are anathema for such individuals (Riley-Smith, 2015; Clark, 2016). 
For ‘Rexiters’, the UK should embrace a more market-oriented regulatory framework, purportedly 
typified by the US model (the attractions of which are reinforced by claimed cultural similarities based 
on common membership of some incipient ‘Anglosphere’).  
Put in such terms then, Brexit, rather than being a push for ‘sovereignty’ per se – at least in 
terms of its leading protagonists – really is about reasserting the principles of market fundamentalism, 
or ‘completing the Thatcherite revolution’ (Hutton, 2017). Andrea Leadsom, one-time Conservative 
Party leadership aspirant (and currently Business Secretary in Boris Johnson’s Cabinet) voiced these 
sentiments in no uncertain terms in 2012 when she stated that: 
I envisage there being absolutely no regulation whatsoever – no minimum wage, no 
maternity or paternity rights, no unfair dismissal rights, no pension rights—for the 
smallest companies that are trying to get off the ground, in order to give them a chance 
(Leasom, cited in Bienkov, 2016).  
In a similar vein, Dr Liam Fox, Secretary of State for International Trade until July 2019 when 
Boris Johnson became Prime Minister, stated in the Financial Times in 2012 that: 
To restore Britain’s competitiveness we must begin by deregulating the labour market. 
Political objections must be overridden (our emphasis). It is too difficult to hire and fire 
and too expensive to take on new employees. (Fox, 2012) 
These debates took on increasing stridency after the Cameron Government (unexpectedly) 
returned with a majority in 2015. David Cameron, having promised a referendum on EU membership 
was now obliged to deliver on his promise. Indeed, Boris Johnson was reported in The Telegraph at 
the time as stating: 
We have got to hang very tough. I looked at the headlines this morning about the 
possibility of Britain dropping its insistence on changes to employment law and I thought 
that was very disappointing. 
I think one of the reasons we have got low growth in Europe is not just travails of the 
Eurozone but also because we’ve got too much regulation, too much stuff coming from 
Brussels, too many laws that are promulgated by Brussels that make it hard for business. 
So I think we need to weigh in on all that stuff, all that social chapter stuff, and I have got 
every confidence that the Prime Minister will do that. (Riley-Smith, 2015; emphasis 
added) 
It is against this backdrop, then, that the impact of the EU on the current body of UK 
employment regulations needs to be reconsidered. Developments in UK labour law over the period of 
EU membership (1973–present) have been affected by different EU directives, but the Conservative 
Party had different reactions to this aspect of the European Integration. In some cases it required 
judgments of the European Court of Justice in the UK to end disputes over some of these Directives 
(Morgan et. al 2000, cited in Waring et al., 2006). In particular, the initial opt-out of the UK in relation 
to the Social Chapter (under the Maastricht Treaty) with the Conservative Government, indicated a 
clear position in relation to European integration in this area. However, once Tony Blair became Prime 
Minister in 1997, the UK immediately announced its intention to opt in, demonstrating a very different 
perspective. 
In this sense, the UK industrial relations system could be seen to have shifted from one of 
voluntaristic collective bargaining with little direct state involvement other than setting minimum 
wages and conditions in residual sectors, to an individualist set-up underpinned by a platform of 
statutory employment rights. The more recent period of Conservative–Liberal Democrat (2010 - 2015) 
and now Conservative government (2015 – present) had to date seen a limited roll-back of protective 
legislation, notably around statutory service thresholds for unfair dismissal law and trade union rights 
which were not covered under EU provisions (Heyes, 2016).  
In this context, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron included in his manifesto of 2010, an 
objective to repatriate EU employment law (BBC 2016). In the lead-up to negotiations over the UK’s 
continued membership of the EU, it was expected that Cameron would demand repatriation of 
powers relating to the Working Time Directive and Temporary Agency Workers Directive. However, 
these were not pursued as they would have necessitated major treaty revisions (Heyes, 2016). Still, as 
Heyes notes, and as evidenced in the quotes above, the fact that these provisions would even be 
flagged as items for negotiation pointed to the continued ‘genuine desire of many Conservative 
politicians to end EU influence over UK employment legislation’ (Heyes, 2016). 
In considering these demands as proof that the UK could reduce the scope of EU employment 
laws as a ‘concession’ from Brussels in order to encourage UK voters to want to stay in the EU, it was 
rather unclear which demographic would be enthused by having a platform of employment rights 
removed from it.  What was notable from the subsequent referendum campaign, was the almost 
complete absence of arguments from Brexiteers to promote further market-oriented regulation. 
Rather, the ‘Leave’ campaign focussed on arguing that freedom of movement of labour and 
consequent migration of workers from Central and Eastern European member states in particular 
were depriving UK workers of jobs and were lowering wages in the economy. A vote for Leave was a 
vote to ‘take back control’ of the UK border and reduce immigration. That the vote for Leave was 
significant in the traditional Labour-voting areas of the old industrial Midlands and North of England 
and Welsh valleys suggests that arguments around migration and low-paid workers had more traction 
with voters than any nascent concerns over employment rights (Salh et al., 2017).  Hence, it is to this 
issue of migration and ‘identity politics’ that we now turn. 
Anti-migrant sentiment: blaming the ‘other’ 
The ‘winning’4 of the 2014 European Parliament elections by the UKIP in the UK demonstrated how 
politically engaged potential Leavers and anti-EU voters could be. This created an exceptional 
circumstance, since UKIP MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) were working in an institution 
that they advocate to leave. Having MEPs that campaign to leave the EU is very significant in itself, but 
the UK was not the only country that has voted for political parties that are critical to some extent of 
the European Union as the recent elections of May 2019 demonstrate. The Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (EFN) in particular, a European Parliament group created in 2015 represents ideas linked to 
Euroscepticism and Anti-migration discourses achieved 58 MEPs (see Table 1 for trends). In June of 
2019, EFN was renamed as Identity and Democracy and includes political parties from almost a third 
of the EU countries, while the new Brexit Party created by Nigel Farage is part of the Non-Inscrits 
group.  
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
A year before the British general elections took place in 2015, the outcome of the EU elections 
and the success of UKIP increased the discussions around migration and the EU on British political 
parties.  The then Prime Minister, David Cameron decided to include a proposal for a referendum on 
the future of the UK in the EU in his manifesto for the 2015 elections. He also attempted to discuss 
issues around EU migration with the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel before launching the 
referendum.  
The serving President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, revealed how Cameron explained to 
him that the idea of including a commitment to an in-out referendum in his party’s manifesto was 
linked to his expectations to need again a coalition after the elections (Boffey, 2019). The expectation 
of another coalition with the Liberal Democrats, for the 2015-2020 Parliament, would have resulted 
in the Conservative’s coalition partners rejecting any such referendum (Boffey, 2019). However the 
unexpected outright majority for the Conservative Party eliminated the need to work with the Liberal 
Democrats altogether.  
In relation to the second matter, Angela Merkel denied the possibility of changing freedom of 
movement of labour (Mason and Oltermann, 2014). The EU Single Market is characterised by four so-
called ‘fundamental freedoms’- — freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labour. It was 
this last stricture that was so objectionable to UKIP supporters and latterly to the Conservative Party, 
reacting against perceived high levels of EU migration to the UK. When the UK ‘opened its doors’ to 
migrants from Central and Eastern European EU states in 2004, there was a threefold increase in the 
number of EU migrants per year to the UK relative to expectations that in themselves were based on 
a misinterpretation of estimates provided in the report undertaken by Professor Christian Dustmann 
for the then Blair Labour Government in 2003 (Lowther, 2013). It is important to understand that to 
change this right to freedom of labour mobility would have required a change to the Single Market, a 
move which would have required the agreement of all EU countries, not just the German Chancellor. 
The Essex Continuous Monitoring Surveys (ECMS) show how migration was already affecting UK 
attitudes towards the EU (Clarke et al., 2017). The different types of migration —of EU citizen-migrants 
and of refugees — became mixed together (Gietel-Basten, 2016) adding more confusion.  Brexiteers 
claimed that migration from the EU had placed undue pressure on public service provision in areas 
such as health care and education (Clarke and Whittaker, 2016). Leave campaigners also blamed 
migrants for low wages earned by workers with low qualifications (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; 
Nickell and Salaheen, 2015). Cameron moved from using the term ‘tourist benefits’ (The Telegraph, 
2013) to discussions on migration a couple of years with Theresa May and Boris Johnson asking in 
2015 to develop a tougher line on EU freedom of movement (The Guardian, 2015). 
   
Understanding the discussion over sovereignty in the UK   
A discussion on public funds available for the National Health Service (NHS) if the UK left the EU was 
publicly linked to the pro-Brexit campaign. In the lead-up to the referendum, the claim by the Vote 
Leave Campaign, that the UK sent GBP 350 million a week to the EU, money that would otherwise be 
available to be spent on the NHS (National Health Service), was believed by nearly half of those 
surveyed in a Kings College London survey (Stone, 2018). This amount of GBP 350 million referred to 
part of the EU budget. It is used to develop the EU institutions, as well as to develop several EU policies 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy. This policy directly benefits British farmers. Therefore if the 
UK left the EU, British farmers would lose these funds and the prices of British produced food would 
likely increase. The effect would clearly be felt by those with lower incomes more than by the upper 
classes. To sum up, the idea that there would automatically be GBP 350 million more a week for the 
NHS if Britain left the EU would be possible only if the UK was willing to avoid replacing at British level 
all the work done by the EU on behalf of the UK and in favour of the UK. Therefore, this claim was not 
realistic. Farage admitted the day after the referendum that he could not guarantee those funds to 
the NHS (Stone, 2016).  
At the same time, it was suggested that if the UK left the EU, a trade agreement with US would 
be developed. The visit in June 2019 from US President Donald Trump to the UK saw discussions 
around a potential UK-US trade agreement. These discussions reignited fears that the publicly funded 
National Health Service (NHS) would be ‘on the table’ for trade negotiations and potential 
marketisation (Neville, 2019). The GBP 350 million a week claim, and the wish to support the NHS that 
it mobilised, appears to have reflected a strong public sentiment that, ideologically speaking, was 
inconsistent with support for UK-US trade negotiations, given the threat of a US demand to negotiate 
the future of the free provision of healthcare in the UK. The same supporters of the NHS, by voting 
leave and creating the option of negotiating agreements with relatively more economically powerful 
countries such as the US, actually made the NHS more vulnerable to external negative influences. Thus  
the creation of a misleading contest between support for the EU and the NHS amongst an electorate 
whose fears of NHS marketisation would more likely be realised it Britain left the EU, indicates a 
mismatch in the discussion around economic sovereignty, public services and the real chances of 
protecting the public sector.  
Discussion around sovereignty includes discussions of the real trade power that a mid-size 
economy such as the UK can have when developing agreements with countries such as the US, China 
or India. In today’s globalised world, economic ‘sovereignty’ for the individual nation-state can only 
ever be partial, as all trade agreements involve a trade-off of sovereignty (even more so for smaller 
and mid-sized open economies). The mottos relating to ‘take back control’ as well as ‘we want our 
control back’ were significant in the discussion over perceptions of British sovereignty and how to in 
theory achieve them (Taylor, 2017:73). Overall, these different mottos were used with the same 
purpose.  
The then Prime Minister, Theresa May, enacted the two year Article 50 5 withdrawal process on 
March 29th 2017. The initial stance of the UK Government was to argue for selective access to a Single 
Market for goods, but to exclude freedom of movement of labour. The logic here was that workers 
who had voted Leave as a protest against the erosion of wages and working conditions could expect 
that  the consequent restriction on labour supply from the EU would increase their relative bargaining 
power. However, it is difficult to see how this expectation would be realised in practice, given the 
greater strength of EU regulatory support foremployment rights and the greater strength of trade 
unions in other EU countries compared with theUK. Also, as increases in the British minimum wage 
are based on decisions taken at national level, without any EU involvement, workers’ hopes of higher 
wages outside the EU seem ill-founded. In any case, EU negotiators made it very clear that this 
approach of seeking to negotiate only parts of the single market was unacceptable.  
The withdrawal agreement that was eventually concluded with the EU (but not ratified by the UK’s 
Parliament at the time of writing) contained three key elements: first, to safeguard the rights of EU 
citizens in the UK (and vice-versa); second, to ensure that UK financial commitments to the EU budget 
for the period 2014-2020 were upheld (the so-called ‘divorce bill’); and third, to ensure that there 
would be no return to a ‘hard border’ in Northern Ireland (so as to uphold the 1994 peace agreement 
and maintain a unified market across Northern and southern Ireland). The last provision was referred 
to as a ‘backstop’. In order to achieve this, the proposal in the withdrawal agreement was to keep the 
whole of the UK in the EU Customs Union for a ‘temporary’ period until a point was reached where 
other (technological) solutions to the problem of a hard border in Northern Ireland become viable 
(Roberts and Boffey, 2017). For the EU, this so-called ‘backstop’ is vital, as the EU regards its role as a 
promoter of peace in Northern Ireland and the lack of a hard border as integral to peace. But it is also 
vital because the Republic of Ireland (a member of the EU) is against a hard border with the UK. Until 
the existing deal is ratified, or an alternative deal is agreed by the European Union and the UK and 
then ratified by Parliament, circular debates regarding the backstop will continue indefinitely. 
Early negotiations, which centred on a Norway-style trade agreement, incorporating membership 
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA), rather than a 
more limited arrangement, led to a backlash from pro-Brexit MPs such as the group of pro-Brexit 
Conservative MPs that denote themselves as the ‘European Research Group’ (ERG), chaired by Jacob 
Rees-Mogg (Roberts, 2018). Theresa May tried on three occasions to get her withdrawal agreement 
through Parliament, without success, as these MPs voted with the Opposition to deny her a majority; 
at the time of writing, no agreement had been ratified by the British Parliament. 
The Government’s articulated stance led to the Cabinet resignations of prominent Leave 
referendum campaigners Boris Johnson and David Davis. As such, for ERG the Government’s proposals 
risk the UK being kept in a customs union with the EU indefinitely, which would undermine the ‘clean’ 
(hard) Brexit they were seeking, whereby the UK would only enter into negotiating a free trade 
agreement with the EU, plus a number of ad-hoc additions. This would, in essence, be similar to the 
arrangements that Canada has with the EU, but with additional special measures. Equally, for the 
Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; whose support the Conservative Government 
needs to command a majority in the House of Commons), the proposals added to their fears that 
Northern Ireland in effect would diverge away from the rest of the UK. 
The subsequent failure to exit the EU on March 29th 2019 and granting of an extension of the 
Article 50 countdown period to October 31st 2019 by the EU unleashed turmoil in the governing 
Conservative Party.  Hence, Theresa May resigned on June 7th 2019, to be replaced by a new leader 
who would be elected via a postal ballot of Party members and revealed on July 22nd 2019. May 
resigned under pressure by her own MPs after they threatened a leadership challenge, after a 
disastrous showing in EU Parliament elections on May 23rd 2019 that the UK was obliged to take part 
in as a result of the Article 50 extension period. These elections were notable for the subsequent 
polarisation of the UK vote, with both main parties gaining only a combined 21% of the vote. In 
contrast the ‘Brexit Party’ the latest political vehicle of Nigel Farage (former leader of the UK 
Independence Party, or UKIP) — gained the largest individual party vote share at 31%, whilst the 
‘Remainer’ parties (Liberal Democrats, Greens, Welsh and Scottish nationalists etc.) gained a 
combined 40% of the vote (Jennings, 2019). In the end, Boris Johnson became the Prime Minister – 
elected by Conservative Party members to deliver Brexit, ‘come what may’ by October 31st 2019, to 
use Johnson’s words. The resultant stand-off and standing down (‘prorogation’) of Parliament by 
Johnson (at the time of writing) means that there is a continuing high degree of uncertainty over when 
(if) the UK exits the EU. 
Brexit: where do we go from here? 
As such, going forward, at the time of writing (September 2019), the current parliamentary impasse 
over the ratification of a withdrawal agreement raises the somewhat problematic issue of trying to 
offer insights as to what the likely outcome of Brexit will be — assuming of course, that Brexit is carried 
out and that some circumstance preventing this, such as a ‘Remain’ vote in another referendum, does 
not come to pass. Such an outcome is not improbable at the time of writing, although it would not be 
without its difficulties. Referenda are usually binary, because those which give multiple choices are 
potentially subject to the Condorcet paradox. 6   
In all probability, therefore, another referendum could be faced with a difficult situation in 
which a majority of voters still wish to leave the EU, as per the 2016 referendum, but does not 
generate a clear majority in terms of what kind of Brexit they want. Whereas a second referendum 
with the same question may be seen, by some in the electorate, as an attempt to reverse the decision 
of the identical first referendum. As such, the prospect of ‘no deal’ at the time of publication also 
remains a possibility, given the professed stance of Prime Minister Johnson to effect departure from 
the EU by 31st October 2019. 
In any event, a sudden ‘no deal’ exit would trigger a significant economic shock and would 
greatly increase the risk of a recession. Key industries such as the automotive sector, heavily 
dependent on supply chain linkages into the rest of the EU, have seen falls in production due to 
ongoing Brexit uncertainty and new investment in plant and equipment has stalled. One car maker, 
Honda, has announced its intention to cease production in the UK after 2021, with the attendant loss 
of some 7,000 jobs (Davies et al., 2019). Others, such as BMW and Jaguar Land Rover (and also Airbus) 
are also reviewing operations with the threat of relocation from the UK ever-present, should they face 
any disruptions to their supply chains in the event of a hard Brexit. 
As such, leaked impact assessments produced by The Treasury suggested that in the case of a 
‘soft’ Brexit, in the long-run, annual GDP would be between 0.6% and 2.6% below what it would have 
been in a status quo scenario (House of Commons, 2018). In contrast, a ‘no-deal’ Brexit would lead to 
a reduction in annual GDP of between 5% and 10.3% (ibid.). These estimates are in the range of 
estimates also produced by academics.  
The resignation of Theresa May, and her replacement with a hard Brexit-supporting PM in the 
guise of Boris Johnson has served to increase the prospect of a ‘no deal’ exit. However, Boris Johnson 
is at the time of writing in a difficult position. He has lost his majority through the resignation of several 
MPs (including his own brother) after deciding to request and achieve Royal consent to prorogue 
Parliament until 14th October (leaving only three days before an EU Summit in Brussels takes place, 
when a potential extension will be approved or not by other EU members). The bill avoiding a no-deal 
scenario achieved Royal consent on 9th September 2019. By 1st November, Johnson would have to 
choose between implementing the mandate from Parliament asking the EU for an extension (probably 
until January 2020), or revoking Article 50, or face the consequences of having a no deal which goes 
against British law (since 14th October).  
For Johnson, the passing of this legislation, and the defeat in the Commons on 9th September 
of a second Government attempt to force an October election, have severely narrowed the range of 
options open to him to try and force an early election. Given Johnson’s proroguing of Parliament, the 
earliest point at which MPs may vote on an election (requiring a two-thirds majority under the UK’s 
Fixed Term Parliament Act) is 14th October, making an election unlikely before December (when 
ostensibly EU assent to requesting an extension of Article 50 will have been attained). 
Johnson could yet try to rescue Theresa May’s failed withdrawal agreement under some token 
rewording, but as Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage is now claiming that Johnson risks ‘selling the 
country down the river’, he appears to be running out of wriggle room with Brexiteers. Hence, any 
perceived softening on his Brexit ‘do or die by October 31st’ stance would in all likelihood mean Tories 
competing with Brexit Party candidates in a subsequent election — and the prospect of splitting the 
Leave vote and thereby ushering in a Corbyn Labour Government. 
Ultimately, however, the political situation in the UK remains febrile and thus the outcome of 
the Brexit process is extremely difficult to predict. Post-referendum, in addition to the impasse over 
the status of the Northern Ireland border, there is Scottish (and Welsh) government dissatisfaction 
over perceived lack of consultation by the UK Government: i.e., of the ‘uncertainty surrounding … 
constitutional voice for the devolved institutions in Scotland and elsewhere’ (McHarg and Mitchell, 
2017). This uncertainty in turn adds further impetus to the argument of reunification on the island of 
Ireland, or of Scottish independence (which came close to success in 2014). Hence, should Brexit 
happen, the future of the UK in surviving as a political entity looks bleak. Such predictions are not new, 
with Tom Nairn having first penned The Break-up of Britain over 40 years ago (Nairn, 1977). However, 
Brexit, with the seemingly intractable constitutional issues generated in its wake, has given them 
renewed vigour and validity.  
Depending on the type of Brexit the UK implements, the country will either remain within the 
European regulatory orbit, or otherwise drift into the American one.  If the UK Government wishes to 
retain access to the EU Single Market for goods and services then it will also have to accept EU 
regulatory standards and retain freedom of movement of labour. If it chooses to remain in a customs 
union with the EU then it cannot conduct an independent trade policy. If it chooses to exit the EU 
Customs Union so as to pursue trade deals with other countries then the US is the most obvious 
country to pursue a trade agreement with, given that it is the UK’s largest export market.  
In both cases, the UK would end up heavily influenced by the regulations, norms and 
processes, of either the EU or the US. Such an outcome goes against the idea of taking back control. 
Indeed – somewhat ironically, given our earlier conjecture that for some voters Brexit is a rejection of 
neoliberalism — should the UK drift into the American orbit as a result of a hard Brexit and embrace 
a ‘trade deal’ with the US it is likely that it will be exposed to further neoliberal market-oriented 
measures. Realignment towards American regulatory standards would occur with pressure from the 
US to loosen environmental and food standards, and, as noted earlier with regards to the NHS, open 
up its public services to US corporate interests.  
In neither of these cases, will the expectations of those who voted to leave the EU be upheld, 
and it will be important to evaluate the impact of these disappointments on British society, whether 
Remainers, Leavers or indifferent, in the post-Brexit landscape. Salh et al. (2017) suggest that 
businesses could equally lobby government to relax any stringent migration conditions and this may 
yet occur should Brexit proceed.  In terms of the labour regulatory framework, the need to secure 
Brexit through a hostile Parliament limits any Conservative Government manoeuvre to entertain 
further dilution of employment regulation for the foreseeable future. 
However, to conclude, if it may reasonably be asserted that Brexit is an attempt to impose 
more market-led regulation on the UK under the attempt to restore what it is perceived by some as 
‘sovereignty’, then the labour market implications would suggest that the scope for further departures 
from EU strictures in this regard would occur in the event of a hard Brexit, resulting in realignment 
with US labour regulation conventions.  It remains to be seen how these conflicting dynamics play out. 
Declaration of conflicting interests 
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or 
publication of this article. 
Funding  
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article. 
References 
Barth C and Bijsmans P (2018) The Maastricht Treaty and public debates about European 
integration: the emergence of a European public sphere? Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies 26(2): 215-231. 
Bienkov A (2016) Andrea Leadsom called for minimum wage and maternity pay to be scrapped for 
small business. Politics.co.uk.  5 July. Available at: 
https://www.politics.co.uk/news/2016/07/05/minimum-wage-maternity-pay-scrapped-
plans-andrea-leadsom (accessed 3 July 2019).  
Boffey D (2019) Cameron did not think EU referendum would happen, says Tusk. The Guardian. 22 
January. Available at:  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/21/donald-tusk-
warned-david-cameron-about-stupid-eu-referendum-bbc (accessed 29 June 2019).  
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC (2016) EU reform deal: What Cameron wanted and what he 
got 20 February. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-
35622105 (accessed 18 July 2019). 
Chowdhury A and Żuk P (2018) From crisis to crisis: Capitalism, chaos and constant 
unpredictability. The Economic and Labour Relations Review 29(4): 375-393. 
Clark E (2016) Brexit would boost UK economy by £4.3bn claims Patel. Belfast Telegraph 18 May. 
Available at: https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/news/brexit-would-boost-uk-
economy-by-4-3bn-claims-patel-34723908.html (accessed 3 July 2019). 
Clarke HD, Goodwin M and Whiteley P (2017) Why Britain voted for Brexit: an individual-level 
analysis of the 2016 Referendum vote.  Parliamentary Affairs 70(3): 439–464.  
Clarke S and Whittaker M (2016) The importance of place: Explaining the characteristics 
underpinning the Brexit vote across different parts of the UK. Resolution Foundation, 15 
July. Available at: https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/the-important-of-
place-explaining-the-characteristics-underpinning-the-brexit-vote-across-different-parts-
of-the-uk/ (accessed 3 July 2019). 
Davies R, Kollewe J and Jolly J (2019) Honda's Swindon plant closure could lead to 7,000 job losses. 
The Guardian, February 19. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/feb/19/honda-confirms-swindon-plant-will-
close-in-2021 (accessed 3 July 2019). 
Dustmann C and Frattini T (2014) The fiscal effects of immigration to the UK.  Economic Journal 124: 
F593–643.  
Fetzer T (2018) Did austerity cause Brexit? CESifo Working Paper Series 7159, CESifo Group Munich. 
Available at: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7159.pdf (accessed 3 July 2019). 
Fontana C and Parsons C (2015) ‘One woman's prejudice’: did Margaret Thatcher cause Britain's 
anti-Europeanism?  Journal of Common Market Studies 53(1): 89-105. 
Fox L (2012) The pressing case to cut both taxes and spending. Financial Times 22 February. 
Available at:  https://www.ft.com/content/2ee5b8de-5c8d-11e1-8f1f-00144feabdc0 
(accessed 2 July 2019). 
Frieden J (2018) The politics of the globalization backlash: Sources and implication. Paper for Annual 
Meetings of the American Economics Association panel on Making Globalization Inclusive. 
Philadelphia, January 5-7, 2018. Available at: 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jfrieden/files/the_politics_of_the_globalization_backlash
.pdf (accessed 2 July 2019). 
Gietel-Basten S (2016) Why Brexit? The toxic mix of immigration and austerity. Population and 
Development Review 42(1): 673–680. 
Golec de Zavala A, Guerra R and Simão C (2017) The relationship between the Brexit vote and 
individual predictors of prejudice: Collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism, social 
dominance orientation. Frontiers in Psychology 8(1): 1-15.  
Hearne D, Semmens-Wheeler R and Hill K (2019) Explaining the Brexit vote: a socioeconomic and 
psychological explanation of the referendum vote. In: de Ruyter A and Nielsen B (eds) 
Brexit Negotiations After Article 50: Assessing Process, Progress and Impact. Bradford, UK: 
Emerald Publishing, pp. 89-112. 
Heyes J (2016) After Brexit where next for UK employment rights? Sheffield Political Economy 
Research Institute comment blog, July 14th. Available 
at:http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2016/07/14/after-brexit-where-next-for-uk-employment-
rights/(accessed 3 July 2019).  
House of Commons (2018) EU Exit Analysis Cross Whitehall Briefing. Available at:  
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/Exiting-the-European-
Union/17-19/Cross-Whitehall-briefing/EU-Exit-Analysis-Cross-Whitehall-Briefing.pdf 
(accessed 2 July 2019). 
Hutton W (2017) They’re back, as wrong as ever. Enough of Nigel Lawson and his band of 80s ultras. 
The Guardian, 22 October. Available at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/21/enough-of-nigel-lawson-and-
his-band-of-80s-ultras-brexit (accessed 12 September 2019). 
Jennings W (2019) Election results reveal Britain's deepening polarisation over Brexit. Sky News, 27 
May.  Available at:  https://news.sky.com/story/election-results-reveal-britains-deepening-
polarisation-over-brexit-11729331 (accessed 10 September 2019). 
Jessop B (2018) Neoliberalization, uneven development, and Brexit: further reflections on the 
organic crisis of the British state and society. European Planning Studies. 26(9): 1728-1746. 
Kuenssberg L (2010) David Cameron sees only delight in closer Turkish ties. BBC News. Available at:  
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10769820 (accessed 25 June 2019) 
Lowther, E (2013) Prof says his '13,000 EU migrants' report 'misinterpreted' BBC News, 7 March. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21682810 (accessed 15 September 2019). 
Margaret Thatcher Foundation (2019) The Bruges speech, 20 September 1988. Available at 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/Bruges.asp (accessed 28 May 2019). 
Mason R and Oltermann P (2014) EU freedom of movement non-negotiable, says Germany. The 
Guardian, 3 November. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/03/eu-
freedom-of-movement-non-negotiable-germany (accessed 4 July 2019).  
McHarg A and Mitchell J (2017) Brexit and Scotland. The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 19(3): 512-26. 
Menon A (2018) Academic engagement in febrile times: The case of the UK in a changing Europe. 
Political Insight 9(2): 15-18.  
Nairn T (1977) The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. London, UK: New Left Books. 
Neville S (2019) Could the NHS be part of a US-UK trade deal? Financial Times, 5 June. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/7795cb64-877d-11e9-97ea-05ac2431f453 (accessed 3 July 
2019). 
Newman H (2018) Even without a deal, there are long-term gains from Brexit. Politico 13 October 
2018. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/even-with-no-deal-there-are-long-
term-gains-from-brexit/ (accessed 3 July 2019). 
Nickell S and Saleheen J (2017) The impact of EU and Non-EU immigration on British wages. IZA 
Journal of Development and Migration 7(1): 1–28.  
Pidd H (2016) Blackpool's Brexit voters revel in 'giving the metropolitan elite a kicking'. The Guardian 
27 June. Available at:  https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/27/blackpools-
brexit-voters-revel-in-giving-the-metropolitan-elite-a-kicking (accessed 3 July 2019). 
Riley-Smith B (2015) Boris Johnson: I could vote for Britain to leave the European Union. The 
Telegraph, 1 September. Available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/11836209/Boris-Johnson-I-
could-vote-for-Britain-to-leave-the-European-Union.html (accessed 3 July 2019). 
Roberts D and Boffey D (2017) Donald Tusk: UK is dropping cake-and-eat-it approach to Brexit. The 
Guardian, 26 September. Available at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/26/donald-tusk-uk-cake-and-eat-it-
approach-brexit (accessed 3 July 2019). 
Roberts G (2018) Brexit vote: Nine Tory tribes Theresa May needs to convince. BBC News 29 
November. Available at:  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46386172 (3 July 2019). 
Rodríguez-Pose A (2018) Commentary: The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do 
about it). Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 11(1): 189-209.  
Salh S, Nyfoudi M and De Ruyter A (2017) Future regulation of the UK workforce. In Bailey D and 
Budd L (eds), The Political Economy of Brexit. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Agenda. 
Stone, J. (2016) Nigel Farage backtracks on Leave campaign's '£350m for the NHS' pledge hours after result. 
The Independent 24 June. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-
referendum-result-nigel-farage-nhs-pledge-disowns-350-million-pounds-a7099906.html (accessed 17 
September 2019). 
Stone J (2018) British public still believe Vote Leave ‘£350million a week to EU’ myth from Brexit 
referendum. The Independent, 28 October. Available at: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/vote-leave-brexit-lies-eu-pay-money-
remain-poll-boris-johnson-a8603646.html (accessed 4 Jul 2019). 
Swales, K (2016) Understanding the Leave vote. London: NatCen Social Research. Available 
at: http://natcen.ac.uk/media/1319222/natcen_brexplanations-report-final-web2.pdf 
(accessed 4 July 2019). 
Taylor G (2017) Understanding Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union. Bingley, UK: 
Emerald. Available at: http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/34071 (accessed 9th September 2019). 
The Guardian (2015) Conservative conference: Cameron rivals call for harder line in EU talks 9th of 
November 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/07/conservative-
conference-cameron-eu-johnson-may-immigration (last time accessed 9th September 
2019). 
The Independent Ireland (2017) Theresa May's Brexit speech in full. 17 January. 
(https://www.independent.ie/business/brexit/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-in-full-
35374214.html (accessed 19 July 2019). 
The Telegraph (2013) David Cameron: we will keep out EU benefit tourists.  6 January. Available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9783545/David-Cameron-we-will-keep-out-
EU-benefit-tourists.html (accessed 12 September 2019). 
Toye J (1987) Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development 
Economics. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. 
Waring P, De Ruyter A and Burgess, J (2006) The Australian Fair Pay Commission: Rationale, 
Operation, Antecedents and Implications. The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 
16(2): 127-46. 
 
 
Table 1 EU wide vote shares before and after 2019 European Parliament elections 
2014 results  2019 results Name of the group 
52 38 Left (GUE/NGL) 
186 153 Socialists and Democrats (S and D) 
52 69 Greens (EFA) 
68 105 Liberals (ALDE) 
21 8 Independent MEPs (NI) 
217 179 Centre Right (EPP) 
76 63 Conservatives (ECR) 
41 54 Populists (EFD) 
37 58 Right-Wing nationalists (ENF) 
 24 New or unaffiliated MEPs 
GUE/NGL:  Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
EFA: European Free Alliance 
ALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
NI: Non-Inscrits 
EPP: European People’s Party 
ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists 
EFD: Europe of Freedom and Democracy 
ENF: Europe of Nations and Freedom 
MEP: Member of the European Parliament 
Source: BBC, 2019. 
 
About the authors  
Alex de Ruyter is Professor and Director of the Centre for Brexit Studies at Birmingham City 
University. His research covers globalisation, regional economic development, labour market and 
social exclusion issues. He has published over 60 articles in leading national and international 
economic journals and has been the recipient of research funding, including an ESRC grant to study 
on the effects on subsequent employment experience following the 2005 MG Rover plant closure. 
Arantza Gomez Arana is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations and a Fellow at the Centre 
for Brexit Studies at Birmingham City University. She has collaborated in research projects funded by 
the European Union and is a Co-Opted Committee Member (2018-2019) of  the BISA (British 
international Studies Association) European Security Working Group.  
Jay Rowe is a PhD student in the Centre for Brexit Studies at Birmingham City University. He has 
worked for several SME and non-profit organisations, and is reading for a Social Science PhD on the 
topic 'Understanding the Changing Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit'.  
Rebeccca Semmens-Wheeler is a Lecturer in Psychology and Fellow at the Centre for Brexit Studies 
at Birmingham City University. She is undertaking research projects in creativity and meditation, and 
on attitudes towards Brexit. 
Kimberley Hill is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at Northampton University and 
Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Brexit Studies at Birmingham City University. She uses mixed-
method approaches to researching social cognition and public health, with a focus on decision-
making processes and contextual factors. 
 
 
1 In this context, it is worth noting that the part of the UK (or more precisely, an Overseas Crown Dependency) 
with the highest percentage of voters opting to remain in the EU was Gibraltar, an area geographically away 
from Britain and with a land border with another EU country in the form of Spain. 
2 The colloquial term for a measure introduced in the Welfare Reform Act 2012, which reduced the amount of 
housing benefit to which claimants are entitled if they are renting a property deemed to have more than the 
prescribed minimum number of bedrooms. 
3 Nevertheless the same source (ibid.) is at pains to point out that the speech in itself was not intended to be 
anti-EU per se, but rather anti leftist/liberal EU and that Thatcher would not have entertained leaving the EU. 
4 ‘Winning’ in the sense of being the party with the largest individual share of the vote. 
5 Article 50 is the provision in the EU (2009) Lisbon Treaty that denotes the legal process for a member state to 
exit the European Union. 
6 The Condorcet paradox demonstrates that social choices can violate transitivity. Imagine a world in which 
voters have 3 choices: A, B and C.  One third of voters prefer A to B and B to C (A>B>C).  One third of voters 
prefer B>C>A, and the final third of voters prefer C>A>B.  Whatever choice is eventually made (A, B or C), two-
thirds of voters can be made happier by choosing a different outcome.  For example, if A is chosen, both the 
second and third group of voters (i.e. 66.7%) would prefer C.  The same is true for all others.  Even worse, 
 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem demonstrates that, under sensible conditions it is impossible to solve this 
dilemma without some individual being able in effect to ‘dictate’ the social ranking – in other words a form of 
dictatorship. 
